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Abstract: In public goods game experiments, designs implementing non-linearities in the production
are less common than the standard linear setting, especially so under the assumption that the private
goods production and public goods aggregation function are both non-linear. We study a voluntary
contribution game (VCM) in which returns from the private project have diminishing marginal
benefits and the contributions to the joint project exhibit pairwise strategic complementarities. As a
control, we use a public goods game with an identical private production technology, but with the
standard linear public goods aggregation. In addition to the aggregation technology, we manipulate
the group size variable: In both treatments, the subjects will first play a VCM game in groups of
five for 20 rounds, after which the group size is reduced to two, and the game is played for another
20 rounds. A significant over-contribution is observed in both settings when the group size is five.
The rate of over-contribution is much higher under the complementary technology, but as predicted
by theory, the contributions drop drastically when the group size is reduced from n = 5 to n = 2 within
this treatment. Our experiment also provides empirical evidence that the so-called group size effect
is present in both treatments, but it is much weaker under the standard aggregation technology.
Keywords: cooperation; complementarity; laboratory experiment; public goods game
JEL Classification: 91; 92; H41
1. Introduction
A voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) is a decision environment where each individual
makes a decision about how to allocate an endowment of a productive factor between private goods
(where consumption benefits accrue only to the individual) and public goods or a joint project that
benefits all group members. The individual contributions are collected through some aggregating
mechanism, and the aggregated contributions are then distributed to the participants, usually in equal
shares. The linear voluntary contribution mechanism, in which the individual contributions are added
up and then multiplied by some constant, is the most common public goods institution in economic
experiments, as noted by [1].
Consequently, the linear public goods games with dominating strategy equilibria at the boundary
of the action set have been extensively studied by experimenters (for a meta-analysis, see [2]). However,
designs implementing non-linearities in the production of either the private goods or the public goods
are less common, and there are only a few studies that employ a nonlinear earnings function in both
the private and the public goods.
While simple aggregation of individual contributions through summing them up is familiar
and intuitively appealing, joint production or team work organized towards a common goal can be
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characterized by a broad range of production technologies differing in their degree of complementarity,
of which standard summation technology is but one example. Consequently, the technology
aggregating individual contributions can play a major role in deciding how much effort a group
exerts toward a common goal. This is not without real-life parallels: For an academic reader, a not
too unfamiliar situation is one where the coauthors writing a scientific article consider how much
effort to put in designing, analyzing and reporting the results of the study, a case in which their
actions can be either strategic complements or substitutes, depending on their personal skill sets
and the characteristics of the paper, and it is ultimately these factors that determine the success of
the whole endeavor. Other such examples can be found in a wide variety of situations requiring
joint effort, ranging from team sports to the operation of a surgical team, to name a few. In short,
complementarities can be found in any situation where a team of experts with different specializations
works towards a common goal.
In the games where actions are strategic complements, the change in one player’s choice gives the
other player an incentive to move in the same direction. In other words, the increased activity level
of a player has a positive effect on the marginal payoff of the other players, whereas in games with
strategic substitutes, the opposite is true. That is, in a game with strategic complementarities, the best
response to increased cooperation by one player is to increase his/her own level of cooperation, but in
the case of strategic substitutes, the increased activity level of one individual is offset by less activity
by the other players.
In the limiting case, the actions that are strategic complements have the weakest link property:
the minimum effort determines the overall level of production. At the other extreme, strategic
substitutes converge to the best shot actions, where the highest effort level determines the yield from
the public goods [3]. When the canonical public goods model of [4] is generalized by specifying a more
general CES social composition function (SCF) for aggregating individual contributions, it is possible
to construct a whole spectrum of production technologies ranging from the weakest link to the best
shot in their degree of complementarity [5]1.
This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine an intermediate case:
We study a team production game in which private consumption has diminishing marginal benefits
and the individual contributions to the joint project exhibit pairwise strategic complementarities,
which means that the production technology is essentially a Cobb–Douglas function with increasing
returns to scale. We compare the observed behavior under strategic complementarities to a baseline
treatment, where the public goods game has quadratic private payoffs and the standard social
composition function is linear, i.e., the unweighted sum of the individual contributions. In both
settings, partial contribution is a unique equilibrium action. We specify the coefficient for the return
from the public goods in the linear setup and the degree of complementarity between actions in the
game with strategic complements in such a manner that the respective payoffs from both the minimum
action and the maximum action profiles and the equilibrium contribution level to the joint project are
the same under both production technologies when the group size is n = 5.
The experimental evidence suggests that the strategic complementarity of Bertrand markets
induces more cooperative (collusive) behavior than the case with strategic substitutes of Cournot
markets [6–8]. However, the costs of deviating from the best response in Bertrand markets are higher
than in Cournot markets, and consequently, the former converge to Nash equilibrium predictions
more quickly and more completely [9]. For a theoretical overview of Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies
and supermodular games, see [10]. Our experiment contributes to this research by examining the
behavior under strategic complementarity in a public goods or a team production environment, where
1 The work in [5] shows that if the constant elasticity of supply SCF is of the form G = (∑ni g
ρ
i )
1
ρ , where gi is the individual
contribution to the public goods; it approaches the weakest link form as ρ→ −∞; and when ρ→ ∞, the SCF approaches
the best shot public goods production function. Furthermore, if ρ = 1, we end up with the the regular linear SCF, and if
ρ→ 0, the SCF approaches the Cobb–Douglas function, a production technology relevant to this paper.
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in contrast to competitive oligopoly experiments, there is a conflict between individually-rational
and socially-optimal activity. The work in [11] observed that there is significantly more cooperation
with actions exhibiting strategic complementarities than with strategic substitutes in finitely-repeated
two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that in our experiment, the level
of over-contribution in a team production game with strategic complementarities and interior Nash
equilibrium is much higher than in a public goods game with the same interior equilibrium action, but
the standard linear social composition function.
In addition to the form of the composition function, we manipulate the group size in
both treatments. The group size effect in VCM games with the unique Nash equilibrium at the
lower boundary of the action set (full free-riding) is well documented (see, e.g., the survey by [12]).
The first systematic studies documenting the effects of the group size (or lack thereof) while holding
the other variables constant was conducted by [13,14], who carefully carried out experiments that were
designed so that the group size effect could be isolated from the effects of changes in the marginal
incentive to contribute towards the joint project, which they called marginal per capita return (MPCR).
They found that the MPCR multiplier has a strong effect, but that group size has little effect if the
MPCR is large.
In the present study, we keep the MPCR constant in the baseline treatment by adjusting the
multiplier when the group size is altered from n = 5 to n = 2. This is necessary in order to keep the
equilibrium action the same within the baseline treatment. We observe a weak numbers effect: on
average, the subjects contribute slightly more in the linear public goods game in groups of five. In
contrast, the numbers effect is much stronger in the game with strategic complementarities.
2. The Social Dilemma Games with Diminishing Private Benefits
In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we will define the earnings functions for each treatment so that the
equilibrium level of contribution is two or 20% of the initial endowment (e = 10) in both treatments,
when the group size is five. In the larger groups (n = 5), also the minimum and maximum action profiles
yield the same payoff for each group member in each treatment. Section 2.3 will provide details for
how these experimental parameters are obtained. Moreover, when the group size is reduced to two, the
game theoretic equilibrium contribution drops considerably in the treatment with complementarities,
but remains the same in the linear baseline treatment. This is shown in Section 2.4, which presents the
comparative statics predictions with respect to experimental parameters. Respective hypotheses are
presented in Section 2.5, which concludes Section 2.
2.1. Linear Baseline VCM Game
The games studied belong to the class of voluntary contribution mechanism games with the
equilibrium action in the interior of the action set. Individuals decide how much of their endowment
to invest in a private project A and how much to contribute towards a joint project B. As noted by
[15], the simplest way to introduce non-linearity in the private goods is by using a quadratic payoff
function:
UAi (xi) = a(e− xi)−
b
2
(e− xi)2
where e denotes the endowments given to the subjects, xi the contribution to the public goods by subject
i and a and b are constant parameters. In the experiment, this is called a payoff from the investment in
the private project A. The earnings function determining payoffs from the private activity is kept the
same throughout the experiment, whereas the functional form of the social composition function that
determines the payoff from the joint project varies between the treatments.
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In the standard linear summation treatment, the experimenter multiplies the sum of the
contributions by the subjects by some constant M and divides this equally by the entire group,
m = M/n:
UBLi (xi) = m
n
∑
i
xi
In the experiment, we call this a payoff from the investment in the joint project B.
Combining the private and the public earnings functions, we obtain the VCM with diminishing
returns from private consumption:
Πi = a(e− xi)− b2 (e− xi)
2 +m
n
∑
i
xi (1)
where:
x∗i =
m− a
b
+ e
is the dominating equilibrium action equalizing marginal return from private and public goods,
independent of other players’ choices.
2.2. Treatment with Pairwise Complementarities in Joint Production
Also in this treatment, the private benefits are given by an identical quadratic payoff function as
in the linear treatment. However, the investment in the joint project with the complementary earnings
function is defined as follows:
UBSCFi (xi) = xi
n
∑
j 6=i
wxj
that is, for each subject in the group, the investments by the other members are summed up and then
multiplied by her contribution and some constant w, reflecting the degree of complementarity between
their actions. Collecting the private and public parts, we obtain the following general earnings function:
Πi = a(e− xi)− b2 (e− xi)
2 + w
n
∑
j 6=i
xixj (2)
By expanding and rearranging Equation (2), we obtain the linear quadratic payoff function:
Πi = αxi − b2x
2
i + w
n
∑
j 6=i
xixj + C (3)
where α = be− a ≥ 0 and C = ae− be22 .
To solve for the Nash equilibrium action for any weight wi in Equation (3), we employ the
results provided in Ballester et al. [16]; also see Jackson [17]. This is obtained by differentiating
Equation (3) with respect to xi and setting this equal to zero, which gives us a solution for any VCM
game with pairwise complementarities:
xi =
α
b
+
n
∑
j 6=i
w
b
xj (4)
Given that in our case, a, b and w are the same for every player, we can write an equation in vector
form characterizing the solution to Equation (4) as:
x∗ = (I − 1
b
w)−1 α
b
1 (5)
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where I is the identity matrix and 1 a vector of ones. Because the action set is bounded above by the size
of the initial endowment, we know that the interior solution to a game with strategic complementarities
and linear best reply is unique [18].
Assuming symmetric parameters for each agent, we can straightforwardly solve the symmetric
Nash equilibrium level of individual action:
x∗i =
be− a
b− (n− 1)w (6)
2.3. Experimental Parameters
In order to ensure that the observed variation between treatments is due to the differences in the
form of the production function and does not result from the difference in the scale of payoffs,
the outcome of both the minimum and the maximum action profiles should match between
the treatments, in addition to both games having the same equilibrium action (but not necessarily the
same equilibrium payoff). The outcome from the minimum action profile is identical in both treatments
by definition. Fixing the parameter e, the initial endowment, the parameter a, the multiplier of the
investment in the private project A, and the cost parameter b, we obtain a system of two equations in
two unknowns (multipliers w and m):
x∗i =
m− a
b
+ e =
be− a
b− (n− 1)w (7)
and:
nem = we(n− 1)e, (8)
where Equation (7) imposes the restriction that the equilibrium action is the same in both treatments
and Equation (8) ensures that the payoff from the maximum action is the same across treatments2.
Solving for w in Equation (8) and substituting it into Equation (7), it is possible to define the group
payoff multipliers m and w as follows: 
m = a− be(1− 1n )
w = n(a−be(1−
1
n ))
(n−1)e
2.4. Comparative Static Predictions
Given the specification of the linear earnings function Equation (1), we can make some
comparative static predictions: If the coefficient a is increased or cost parameter b is decreased,
the equilibrium contribution level falls as the private project becomes more profitable. In contrast,
the equilibrium action is increasing in the public goods multiplier m. In the game with strategic
complements, given by Equation (2), the equilibrium contribution levels are also decreasing in a and
increasing in b. Furthermore, the equilibrium contribution level is increasing in w, assuming that it is
non-negative (see [17], p. 291–292, for a sketch of the proof). However, the group size has an effect only
in the game with strategic complementarities, where the level of the equilibrium action is increasing in
group size, whereas the dominant action in the linear game is the same irrespective of the group size.
We set the endowment parameter e to 10 (tokens). Choosing b = 2 for the quadratic multiplier,
the maximum value of parameter a approaches 20 at the limit, given the restriction be − a ≥ 0.
2 Since the function determining benefits from the private goods is identical in both treatments, it suffices that the payoff from
the public project is the same between the treatments from the maximum action profile, when everyone allocates the whole
endowment e to the joint project. That is: m∑ni xi = w∑
n
j 6=i xixj. By definition xi = xj = e, and this condition is equivalent
to mne = w(n− 1)e2.
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Given these parameters, a and b, we fix the multiplier a to the largest possible integer value (i.e., [19])
satisfying this constraint. Given Solution (1), this parametrization yields multiplier values m = 3 or
M = 15 in the linear social composition function (SCF) treatment and w = 3/8 in the complementary
SCF treatment with five group members. In order to avoid implementing an unintended focal point at
the middle of the strategy space to which the subjects might feel attracted, we choose parameters so
that the game theoretic solution is less than half of the endowment (e.g., [19]; see also [20]). With the
chosen parameters, the resulting symmetric interior Nash action is equal to two, or 20% of the initial
endowment.
The multiplier w in the game with complementary SCF is interpreted here as the degree of the
complementarity between the actions of the group members in their joint production. Naturally,
the larger the group, the more bite this has in determining the equilibrium action level. Already with a
group size of n = 5 members, the equilibrium action is very sensitive to the magnitude of w, as can be
seen in Figure 1. Note that when 0.475 ≤ w < 0.5, the system has a boundary solution where everyone
contributes every token towards the public goods in groups of five, x∗i = 10. Assuming b = 2, in
groups with five members, the limiting value for the multiplier is 0.5, as any larger value would not
lead to a well-defined or non-negative equilibrium action.
Figure 1. The equilibrium action as a function w in groups of five (red line) and two (blue line), e = 10,
a = 19, b = 2 (complementary SCF).
However, in small groups with two members, the size of w has a very small effect on the level
of the equilibrium action, which is shown by the nearly horizontal blue line in Figure 1. Given this
negligible variation in the level of equilibrium action with respect to parameter w in small groups,
we concentrate on studying experimentally how the group size affects observed behavior, while
keeping the parameter w constant.
In the treatment with complementarities in the public goods production, the larger the group size
is, the higher is the respective equilibrium action, as is depicted by the blue line in Figure 2. However,
the group size has no effect on the equilibrium level when the aggregation technology is linear, as is
illustrated by the red line plotted in the same figure. It is also worth noting the solution to Equation (7)
at group size n = 5.
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Figure 2. The equilibrium action as a function group size: linear baseline treatment (red) and treatment
with complementarities (blue).
In the small groups, fixing w at 3/8, the equilibrium action is 8/13 or 0.615 tokens with group
size n = 2, and the corresponding return from the public goods is 0.14, whereas the action level (0.80
tokens) maximizing joint payoffs is very close to this. As noted above, in the linear baseline treatment,
the equilibrium action remains two also in the small groups.
2.5. Hypotheses
Given the multiplicative effect of group size on the equilibrium action and assuming monetary
payoff maximizing agents, we can make the following game-theoretic predictions:
We should:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Under the complementary aggregation technology (pairwise complementary
treatment VCM), observe a decrease in contributions to the joint project when the group size is reduced
from five to two.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Under the linear technology (baseline control VCM), observe no change in
contributions to the joint project when the group size is reduced from five to two.
The rationale of using the standard linear production VCM as a control treatment is based on the
detected group size effect in the previous literature: contrary to the classical theoretical predictions [21],
in public goods games with a boundary solution, larger groups seem to be more efficient in public
goods production [14]. We compare the average and individual contribution levels under different
group sizes (n = 5 or n = 2 individuals per group) within a treatment. Any difference in this difference
between treatments should reflect also the effect of the functional form of the production function and
not only the ‘behavioral’ group size effect.
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A relevant theoretical model for our work is posited by [22], who employed the well-known
quantal response equilibrium of [23] in explaining the group size effect. In particular, the authors in
[22] note that when the equilibrium level of contributions is in the interior, the average contribution is
likely to be sandwiched between the Nash equilibrium and half the endowment, and contributions
should (stochastically) increase with the marginal value of the public goods and with the endowment.
Furthermore, assuming altruism, i.e., a positive weight that subjects attach to the payoff of others, total
contributions should be increasing in the number of participants. In particular, for public goods games
with quadratic private goods and linear SCF, the expected contribution per person is sandwiched
between the symmetric Nash equilibrium level and half of the endowment.
However, since there is no dominating strategy available, it is harder to predict behavior in the
game with complementary SCF relative to the game with standard linear VCM with n = 5 individuals
per group. On the one hand, the complementary actions may feed each other, and we might see higher
contribution levels than in the standard game, but on the other hand, cooperating is more risky since
one might lose all in case other group members deviate. It has been argued that risk and trust are
closely-related constructs in the economic context of personal exchange, where the uncertainty is often
of a strategic nature, as opposed to mere state-dependent risk (see, e.g., [24,25]). However, there is
evidence suggesting that trusting behavior is not tightly connected to a person’s risk attitudes [26].
To control for this, a Holt–Laury [27] risk aversion instrument was run in both treatments after the
main treatments had taken place.
The payoffs in the pairwise complementary SCF treatment are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 in
Section 3 (respective payoff Tables for the linear baseline treatment are included in the Supplementary
Materials, pages 9–16)). Deviating from the maximum action profile (shown in the bottom right corner
of Table 3 in Section 3) yields the subjects very little in the complementary SCF treatment compared to
the baseline treatment with standard linear production, where free-riding is potentially very lucrative.
By looking at the payoff Table 3, it can be seen that this complementary game exhibits features typical
to stag hunt and other coordination games. Furthermore, the best response to minimum action by other
group members is not zero contribution, but investing 0.5 tokens in the public project B. This feature
could possibly kick start a cooperative spell of increasing best replies and direct the overall behavior
away from mutual defection.
Finally, in the treatment with pairwise complementary SCF, within certain ranges of the action set,
it is possible for a subject to grant others rather large marginal gains in payoff with relatively little
marginal cost to himself/herself, in particular at the higher end of the payoff table. This means that,
should we assume the same level of possible altruism between treatments, this payoff mechanism
might induce much more cooperative behavior.
3. Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the Decision Making Laboratory of the Public Choice Research
Centre (PCRClab) at the University of Turku. The experiment was programmed using the Z-Tree
software [28]. Participants were recruited from a pool (n = 1070) of mostly undergraduate students
using ORSEE software [29]. A total of 80 individuals participated in 4 sessions, with 20 individuals
participating in each session. Both treatments consisted of two sessions or 40 subjects, and each
individual took part in one session only. Some subjects had participated in other decision making
experiments that were unrelated to this research, and a few individuals had previous experience
with the Holt and Laury task. The median age of the participants was 25 years, and 69% (55) of
the participants were female. A copy of the instructions (translated from Finnish) is included in the
Supplementary Materials.
In each session, the subjects were randomly seated at a computer terminal. The instructions were
read out by the experimenter, after which the participants had a few minutes to read them at their
own pace, followed by a few control questions and two practice rounds of a five-player VCM game
(with the aggregating mechanism respective to each treatment). Once the experiment was started, no
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talking was allowed; if a participant had a question, he/she would have to raise his/her hand, and the
experimenter would come to consult him/her individually in private.
The subjects were told that the experiment consisted of three independent parts. In each part,
the subjects would take part in a different task: (i) a 20-fold repetition of a VCM game with a group
size of five and random matching, where the technology aggregating individual contributions to
the public account was either a standard linear or a pairwise complementary production function,
depending on the assigned treatment; (ii) the same game as in Part (i), but with group size n = 2, so that
subjects were randomly paired in each round; and finally, (iii) Holt and Laury’s [27] risk instrument.
The instructions for Parts (ii) and (iii) were dealt to the subjects only after the preceding part was
completed by every subject (see the Supplementary Materials for the specific instructions for each
part.)
After each period, each group member was told how much income he/she gained from each
respective project, the individual investments made by the members of his/her group (including
his/her own investment) in a random order and also the average of and the total of these contributions.
We did not provide information about individual earnings of the other group members.
At the end of the experiment, each subject rolled a 20-sided die twice outside the classroom,
choosing one period out of 20 from Game (i) and one period out of 20 from Game (ii) for payment.
The payoffs from the Holt and Laury lottery were determined by letting each subject roll a 10-sided
die twice. Experimental currency units were used in Tasks (i) and (ii), with a conversion rate of
15 points = 1 EUR, whereas the Holt and Laury lottery payoffs were in Euros. The subjects earned
19.86 EUR on average, including a show-up fee of 3 EUR. The sessions lasted approximately 2 h,
including instruction time.
At the beginning of each period in Games (i) and (ii), the group members were each endowed
with 10 tokens (e = 10), which they were asked to allocate between the private project A and the
public project B with a precision of up to two decimals (so the action set in each period consisted of
any amount between [0.00, 10.00]).
Table 1 shows the marginal and cumulative payoffs from tokens allocated to the activity A,
or payoffs from investing in the private project. The return from the private project was the
same irrespective of the group size. Table 2 shows the separate payoffs ensuing from various
allocations between the private and public goods in the complementarity SCF treatment with
a group size of five and Table 3 the respective total payoffs. The linear treatment has also
similarly constructed payoff tables (shown in the Supplementary Materials, pages 9–16) under the
respective instructions. These tables were handed out to subjects in the experiment to help them in
making the allocation decision. In addition, the subjects were provided with programmed sliders
shown on their display each period, with which they could experiment by trying out different allocation
profiles and the respective payoffs.
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Table 1. Payoffs from Private Project A.
Amount of Investment in Project A Payoff from Investment A
0 0
1 18
2 34
3 48
4 60
5 70
6 78
7 84
8 88
9 90
10 90
Table 2. Potential income from an investment in the project B per different total amounts of investments
in the project B made by the other group members. The leftmost column lists the investments in the
project B by the subject, and the uppermost row shows total amounts of investments made by the other
group members.
Inv.
B Payoff from Investment B, when the sum of investments in Project B made by other group members is
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 11 12 13 14 14 15
2 0 2 3 5 6 8 9 11 12 14 15 17 18 20 21 23 24 26 27 29 30
3 0 2 5 7 9 11 14 16 18 20 23 25 27 29 32 34 36 38 41 43 45
4 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
5 0 4 8 11 15 19 23 26 30 34 38 41 45 49 53 56 60 64 68 71 75
6 0 5 9 14 18 23 27 32 36 41 45 50 54 59 63 68 72 77 81 86 90
7 0 5 11 16 21 26 32 37 42 47 53 58 63 68 74 79 84 89 95 100 105
8 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 84 90 96 102 108 114 120
9 0 7 14 20 27 34 41 47 54 61 68 74 81 88 95 101 108 115 122 128 135
10 0 8 15 23 30 38 45 53 60 68 75 83 90 98 105 113 120 128 135 143 150
With n = 5 individuals per group, the payoff from maximum action profile is 150 tokens in
both treatments, and the payoff from the dominant equilibrium action profile is 118 tokens in the
linear treatment, whereas each member of the group would earn 94 tokens from the symmetric Nash
equilibrium in the complementary treatment. Ending up being the sole contributor to the public goods
still pays off 30 tokens in the linear treatment, but yields nothing in the complementary treatment.
Benefits from free-riding grow in the sum of contributions of other members of the group in the linear
treatment, but the payoff remains zero in the complementary SCF treatment.
To summarize, our main design consists of a setting where we vary the group size from two to five
for both SCF games, and the parameters are specified so that donating two tokens to Activity B is either
dominating or a Nash strategy when the group size is n = 5 individuals. The design and respective
equilibrium contribution levels are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. From the tables, one can see that
Games 2018, 9, 45 11 of 24
in groups of two, the parametrization does not allow much variation between the complementary
SCF treatment, as Nash contribution, group optimum action and minimum action profile yield payoffs
very close to each other in terms of real money.
The third part of the experiment replicates the experiment in Holt and Laury: Subjects faced
a questionnaire with ten decisions, where each decision consisted of a choice between two paired
lotteries, Option A and Option B. The payoffs for Choice A were always 2 EUR or 1.60 EUR and for
Choice B 3.85 EUR or 0.10 EUR. The probabilities for high and low payoffs were the same for both
alternatives for each decision. In the first decision, the probability of the high payoff in both decisions
was 1/10. This probability gradually rose as a subject moved down the decision sheet. The expected
pay off from Option A was higher for the first four choices and for Option B after that, implying that
a risk-neutral subject would switch from Option A to Option B after the fourth decision, whereas
risk-loving subjects would switch earlier and risk-averse subjects later. The options are shown in the
Supplementary Materials, pages 17–18.
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Table 3. Total income from the projects A and B per different total amounts of investments in the project B made by the other group members. The two leftmost
columns list the investments in the projects A and B by the subject, respectively, and the uppermost row shows total amounts of investments made by the other
group members.
A B Total income from the projects A and B, when the sum of investments in Project B made by other group members is
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
10 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
9 1 90 90.75 91.5 92.25 93 93.75 94.5 95.25 96 96.75 97.5 98.25 99 99.75 100.5 101.25 102 102.75 103.5 104.25 105
8 2 88 89.5 91 92.5 94 95.5 97 98.5 100 101.5 103 104.5 106 107.5 109 110.5 112 113.5 115 116.5 118
7 3 84 86.25 88.5 90.75 93 95.25 97.5 99.75 102 104.25 106.5 108.75 111 113.25 115.5 117.75 120 122.25 124.5 126.75 129
6 4 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 102 105 108 111 114 117 120 123 126 129 132 135 138
5 5 70 73.75 77.5 81.25 85 88.75 92.5 96.25 100 103.75 107.5 111.25 115 118.75 122.5 126.25 130 133.75 137.5 141.25 145
4 6 60 64.5 69 73.5 78 82.5 87 91.5 96 100.5 105 109.5 114 118.5 123 127.5 132 136.5 141 145.5 150
3 7 48 53.25 58.5 63.75 69 74.25 79.5 84.75 90 95.25 100.5 105.75 111 116.25 121.5 126.75 132 137.25 142.5 147.75 153
2 8 34 40 46 52 58 64 70 76 82 88 94 100 106 112 118 124 130 136 142 148 154
1 9 18 24.75 31.5 38.25 45 51.75 58.5 65.25 72 78.75 85.5 92.25 99 105.75 112.5 119.25 126 132.75 139.5 146.25 153
0 10 0 7.5 15 22.5 30 37.5 45 52.5 60 67.5 75 82.5 90 97.5 105 112.5 120 127.5 135 142.5 150
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Table 4. Experimental design in the linear SCF production treatment: group size, equilibria and payoffs.
SCF: Standard Linear
Group Size: 5 Group Size: 2
Contributions
Nash Strategy (Dominant) 2 2
Group Optimum 8 3.5
Payoffs
Nash Strategy (Dominant) 118 100
Group Optimum 154 102.25
Min Profile 89.50 89.50
Max Profile 150 60
Table 5. Experimental design in the complementary SCF production treatment: group size, equilibria and
payoffs.
SCF: Pairwise Complementary
Group Size: 5 Group Size: 2
Contributions
Nash Strategy 2 0.61
Group Optimum 10 0.80
Payoffs
Nash Strategy 94 90.38
Group Optimum 150 90.40
Min Profile 89.50 89.50
Max Profile 150 37.50
4. Results
In this section, we first describe our subjects’ risk attitudes as elicited by the Holt and Laury task,
before analyzing how the behavior in public goods games of Parts (i) and (ii) is related to risk
aversion preferences.
4.1. Subjects’ Risk Attitudes
We find that 10% (n = 8) of the subjects had inconsistent risk attitudes, switching back and forth
between risky and safe options at least once. Excluding this subsample from the analysis does not
change the statistical significance of any reported results.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of risk preferences. Data are coded by the number of safe
(A) choices. The risk aversion is measured as the (last) point where a subject switches from the
safe option A to the risky option B. Our experimental subjects were on average quite risk averse,
with a mean switching point of 6.34 (s.d. 1.70). This finding is partially explained by the large share
of female subjects, as women have been found to be more risk averse than men in the previous
risk literature. We also find this difference between genders, although it is not statistically significant
at conventional significance levels. The distribution of risk attitudes did not differ between our two
experimental treatments (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p > 0.22).
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Figure 3. Distribution of the Holt and Laury risk lottery switching points.
4.2. Public Goods Game with the Dominant Interior Solution and Linear Social Composition Function
In this section, we report the results for each treatment separately, after which at the end of
the section, the results for the pooled observations are reported and discussed. For each treatment,
we begin the analysis by looking at the average behavior aggregated over all rounds and individuals,
before analyzing individual level behavior, or taking into account the possible dynamics created by
the repetition of the single-shot VCM game.
In the linear SCF treatment, the individual payoff of agent i is given by:
Πi = 19(10− xi)− 22 (10− xi)
2 + 3
n
∑
i
xi (9)
In Figure 4, we can see that in the groups of five, the average contribution is somewhat spread
(the upper panel), although there is a slight spike near 2.00, the dominant equilibrium action.
The contributions are even more concentrated around the equilibrium action when the group size is
two (the lower panel). Interestingly, the equilibrium action of 2.00 was a modal choice in both cases:
It was chosen as 243 out of 800 (30.38% of the time) rounds with groups of five and allowing for a
tolerance of 0.07 tokens3, 306/800 times (38.25% of the time). In groups of two, the dominant action
was chosen as 305 out of 800 times (38.13%) (343/800 (42.88%), allowing for a tolerance of 0.07).
3 Given the precision of two decimals, the value in the display did not change unless the chosen action diverged more than
0.07 from the equilibrium strategy
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Figure 4. Distribution of average contribution, linear SCF; upper panel: n = 5, lower panel: n = 2.
In Figure 5, the blue line depicts the time path of the contributions averaged over all subjects (n =
40) each period in the linear treatment with five players. The red line shows the respective average
contributions when the group size is two, and the dominant equilibrium contribution level is marked
with a black horizontal line.
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Figure 5. Average contribution to the joint project over 20 periods, linear SCF; n = 5 (blue) and
n = 2 (red).
In groups of five, we observe that the overall average contribution level over rounds and
individuals is 3.26 tokens, which corresponds to an average over-contribution rate of 15.75% compared
to the dominant action of contributing two tokens towards the joint project B4. With smaller groups,
the average contribution over all rounds to the joint project is 2.86 (an average over-contribution of
10.75%), and the spike around the equilibrium action level is more pronounced, reflecting the modal
action.
Our finding that a larger group size induces more cooperative behavior is consistent with the
results obtained in earlier literature [14]. The difference in the distribution of subjects’ average
contributions over all periods is statistically significant (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p < 0.01). That is,
ignoring possible temporal dynamics within the data, we compute each subject’s mean contribution
and then compare the distribution of these averages.
Next, we explore the dynamic structure of the linear SCF games with five and two members by
specifying a fixed effects panel regression. As control variables, we include the gender and and the
risk attitude variables and their interaction term. The dependent measure is individual i’s contribution
to the public goods in period t. In Table 6, we can observe a gender effect: men tend to contribute
significantly more (almost three tokens), albeit this coefficient is only borderline significant. After
controlling for gender, risk aversion does not seem to affect the contribution amount chosen, as less
risk-averse subjects contribute as much as others.
4 We define the over-contribution rate as in [30], that is: (xi − 2)/8.
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Table 6. Contributions to the joint product explained by gender and risk aversion. Groups size n = 5
(left column) and n = 2 (right column), linear SCF. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered on group
and individual.
Dependent Variable
Contribution, n = 5 Contribution, n = 2
(1) (2)
Gender 2.851 * 2.552
(1.646) (2.096)
Risk Aversion 0.123 −0.001
(0.102) (0.072)
Gender × Risk Aversion −0.302 −0.334
(0.229) (0.285)
Observations 800 800
R2 0.084 0.072
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.070
F Statistic (df = 3; 777) 23.808 *** 20.095 ***
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
When the group size is decreased (right panel, Regression (2)) in Table 6, the gender is no longer a
significant regressor, once we cluster the standard errors on individual choice and group.
4.3. Public Goods Game with the Interior Solution and Pairwise Complementary Social Composition Function
With complementary aggregation technology, the individual payoff of agent iis given by:
Πi = 19(10− xi)− 22 (10− xi)
2 +
3
8
n
∑
j 6=i
xixj + C (10)
in our experiment.
In Figure 6, the average contribution levels are depicted as in Figure 4. In groups of five,
the average contribution over all rounds was 6.43 tokens, reflecting an over-contribution rate of
55.38%. The average contribution in groups with n = 2 individuals was 1.19 or an over-contribution of
15.38%. We see that when the group size was larger (n = 5), the contributions were somewhat spread
around the average contribution. In particular, the contributions at the Nash equilibrium level (2.00)
were very few (this action was chosen a total of 14 times in 800 rounds).
Admittedly, in terms of real monetary compensation, the payoffs from the joint project were so
small in the n =2 group treatment, that one can rightfully suspect whether the subjects are properly
incentivized, as making a contribution of one token instead of nothing would yield at most 0.25 euros,
and 0.02 euros if the other group member donated one token similarly. However, choosing one was
precisely the modal action, since out of 800 individual decisions, 237 or 30% involved contributing one
token to the joint project (cf. one chosen as the action in 13 out of 800 choices, when n = 5).
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Figure 6. Distribution of the average contribution, SCF with complementarities; upper panel: n = 5,
lower panel: n = 2.
As in Figure 5 in the linear SCF treatment, in Figure 7, the blue line depicts the time path of the
contributions averaged over all subjects each period (n = 40) with five players in the complementary
SCF treatment. The red line shows the respective average contributions when the group size is
two. However, the respective Nash equilibria contribution levels are marked with straight lines
bearing the respective colors. That is, the blue line illustrates the Nash contribution level 2.00 in the
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treatment with groups of five, and the red line shows the Nash equilibrium level in the n = 2 treatment.
Examining time paths, we see that in the larger groups (n = 5), the average contribution remains way
over its Nash equilibrium throughout the 20 rounds, and more remarkably, there is no end game effect
to be seen. In the smaller groups (n = 2), the average contribution converges relatively quickly very
close to the respective Nash equilibrium level.
Figure 7. Average contribution to the joint project over 20 periods, Strategic complementarity; n = 5
(blue) and n = 2 (red).
By our regression analysis, we find that contrary to the linear baseline treatment, when the
group size was five, men contributed about 2.3 tokens less towards the public goods on average after
controlling for risk aversion, but this coefficient was not statistically significant (Regression (1) in Table
7). However, as the risk aversion increased amongst male subjects, so did their contributions, albeit
the significance of the respective interaction coefficient was weak (p = 0.079). Risk aversion itself had
no significant effect on contributions.
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Table 7. Contributions to the joint product explained by gender and risk aversion. Groups size n = 5,
SCF with complementarities. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered on group and individual.
Dependent Variable
Contribution, n = 5 Contribution, n = 2
(1) (2)
Gender −2.312 −0.290
(1.52) (0.606)
Risk Aversion 0.018 0.0004
(0.148) (0.0607)
Gender × Risk Aversion 0.434 * -0.028
(0.247) (0.080)
Observations 800 800
R2 0.045 0.026
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.025
F Statistic (df = 3; 777) 12.219 *** 6.842 ***
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
In groups of two with complementary SCF, gender, risk aversion and their interaction term had
no statistically significant effect when clustering the observations on groups and individual subjects.
Having examined both treatments separately, we studied the data on the aggregate level. First we
studied the aggregate descriptive statistics for the contribution, whereafter we estimated a regression
for the whole sample by pooling the observations from each treatment together.
Table 8 summarizes the average contributions (standard deviations in parenthesis) and rates
of over-contribution per treatment: there is a slight difference between contribution levels between
groups of two and five in the linear treatment, and that same difference between groups of different
sizes in the complementary SCF treatment is much larger. This is also reflected in the right-hand
side columns, which show that the rate of over-contribution is much higher in the complementary
treatment and group size n = 5 than in other cells.
Table 8. Mean contribution and relative rate of over-contribution per treatment.
Average Contribution OC Rate
Group Size 2 5 2 5
Linear Baseline 2.86 (1.33) 3.26 (1.70) 10.75% 15.75%
Complementarities 1.19 (1.40) 6.43 (1.63) 15.38% 55.38%
Next, we estimate a pooled OLS-regression, where the explained variable is the amount
contributed towards the joint project, and the explanatory variables are the main treatment (linear
vs. complementary) and group size. Individual and time period effects are controlled by time and
individual specific dummy variables5. The results are presented in Table 9. We observe that both the
treatment effect and the group size effect are highly significant, as is their interaction term. The sign of
the treatment effect coefficient is negative; however, this is not to be interpreted as complementarity
being harmful for cooperative behavior: This is explained by the large positive coefficient for the
interaction term between (large group) and complementarity treatment: on the aggregate level, the
5 Reporting of control dummies omitted.
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high level of contributions in the groups of five more than offsets the more modest contributions in
small groups under complementary production, compared to the baseline.
Table 9. Aggregate contribution behavior, pooled OLS.
Dependent Variable
Contribution to the Joint Project
Complementary −0.776 ***
(0.268)
Large 0.719 ***
(0.192)
Complementary × Large 4.842 ***
(0.084)
Constant 3.456 ***
(0.229)
Observations 3200
R2 0.771
Adjusted R2 0.763
Residual Std. Error 1.183 (df = 3080)
F Statistic 87.372 *** (df = 119; 3080)
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The regression analysis confirms the impressions obtained by a casual look at the aggregate
descriptive statistics: both the aggregation technology and the group size have a strong effect on
contributions. As expected by the comparative static predictions, the contributions increase in the
complementary treatment when the group size is increased. We also detect a group size effect present
in the linear baseline treatment, albeit a small one compared to the treatment group.
5. Summary and Discussion
This paper extends the research on public goods in nonlinear environments by specifying a VCM
game where both the private earning mechanism and the social composition function aggregating
individual outputs are nonlinear. We compared this weaker link-type VCM game to the baseline
treatment with the standard linear aggregating function. Interestingly, the familiar numbers effect,
or contributions increasing in group size, is present in both of our treatments. Neither risk attitudes nor
gender were prominent in predicting the contribution behavior; the former (lack of) effect could
be attributed to the characteristics of the experiment: even under neutral framing, the subjects
may interpret this setting involving interpersonal trust and moral choices rather than a neutral,
recurrent investment opportunity (see [26]).
Our results indicate that increasing the group size in the linear SCF treatment results in a higher
level of average contribution towards the public goods. The average contribution over all rounds
is 3.26, which is sandwiched between the Nash equilibrium (2.00) and half of the endowment (5.00).
Having pairwise complementarity in the SCF production induces more cooperative behavior than
what is the case in the linear SCF treatment. However, if we assume altruism, this is to be
expected. Given our setup, we must be cautious when comparing the differences in differences
between treatments, as changing the group size, but keeping the multiplier parameters the same in
the pairwise complementarity treatment actually changes the marginal rate per capita yield from the
joint production. However, the statistical results reported in the respective section confirm what can
be seen by casual observation in the graphs alone: the effect of increasing the group size is stronger in
the treatment group with strategic complementarity in contrast to the difference detected within the
baseline treatment.
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In particular, we found out that the positive feedback resulting from pairwise complementarities
in production enhances cooperative behavior, radically in groups of five. The production technology
aggregating individual contributions favors increasing activity levels and coordinating actions, as even
a weak preferences for altruism or conditional cooperation might induce a virtuous cycle, in which
high levels of contribution in the current period also pave the way to successful future cooperation.
A somewhat puzzling phenomenon is the lack of decline in the contributions over the periods
and the respective absence of the end game effect in both treatments when the group size was five.
Among factors affecting the evolution of the contribution behavior over the periods are the matching
protocol used and the form of feedback provided to the subjects. In our experiment, we employed
stranger matching and, after each round, reported to each group member how much income he/she
gained from each respective project, the individual investments made by the members in his/her group
(including his/her own investment) in a random order and also the average of these investments and
their total amount.
The work in [31] found that in the strangers design, the subjects give more on average. This result
was also found by [32] and [33] in Italy, but not in the U.K., where partners gave more, on average. The
work in [34] found that strangers gave more in their experiment in Spain, but the opposite was true in
the U.S., whereas there is no difference to be found in their experiment in Japan or in the Netherlands,
and the differences in behavior across countries are minor. The work in [35] found no difference, and in
[36–38], the partners design was more conducive to cooperative behavior. The work in [39] provided a
discussion on the results. As is expected, no satisfactory and definite conclusion can be drawn from
the results surveyed, and they note that “if a prediction is based on a single-shot equilibrium, then a
Strangers condition will be most appropriate.” This is also the rationale for us choosing the strangers
design.
In terms of feedback provided to the subjects, in experiments with the stranger design, the
evidence is also mixed. The work in [40] found no effect, whereas in the experiment reported in
[41], aggregate level feedback resulted in subjects making higher contributions to the public goods.
The work in [42] ran a design varying framing (give vs. take), matching (partners vs. strangers)
and feedback (individual vs. aggregate). They found that in a partners setup with the give framing,
there was significantly more free-riding with individual feedback compared to aggregate feedback.
However, no such difference is found in the strangers setup, which is closer to our design.
Due to the conflicting and mixed results in the existing literature, I believe we are justified to
conclude that the magnitude of the effects observed was not exaggerated by design features that would
be especially conducive to cooperative behavior, but it was rather a genuine result of the manipulated
treatment variables. However, the possible interaction between the matching, feedback and various
forms of non-linear social composition functions remains an interesting open question.
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